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APPROVAL OF CITICORP'S APPLICATION TO
EXPAND DATA SERVICES ACTIVITIES:
THE FEDERAL RESERVE
BOARD'S POLICIES
REGARDING NONBANKING ACTIVITIES
A recurring theme in modem banking is the tension between
"federal regulatory statutes designed in part to limit bank activities,
and attempts by banks-often sanctioned by federal banking
authorities--to compete in broader lines of business."1 The Ccorp 2
order announced by the Federal Reserve Board on July 9, 1982 reflects
this theme and presents insights into the Federal Reserve Board's
standards and policies regarding bank holding company expansion into
nonbanking activities. The order permits Citicorp, a bank holding
company, to broaden its business by expanding its data services.3 The
Board approved Citicorp's expanded services by relying on section
4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act,4 which allows the Board to
approve nonbanking services "closely-related" to banking services.5
This note describes the flexible standards developed by the Board
in applying the closely related exemption. These standards give the
Board discretion to approve a wide range of nonbanking activities and
challenge the longstanding policy that banking activities should remain
separate from other commercial activities.&6 Although the Board and
1. Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 606 F.2d 1004, 1010
(D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
2. 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 505 (1982).
3. See id
4. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103(8), 84 Stat.
1760, 1765 (amending section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1848(c)(8) (1976)).
5. See Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull, at 505-06. See infra note 14 for the text of section 4(c)(8).
6. The policy of separation began when Congress concluded that the close association of
commercial banking and securities activities contributed to the collapse of the nation's financial
system in the early days of the Great Depression. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 61 (1981). Congress sought to effect a separation
between national banks and securities activities through enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act. Id
at 62.
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 extended the policy of enforcing separation
between banking and nonbanking activities to bank holding companies. See Pub. L. No. 511, 70
Stat. 133. The restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act were inadequate to deal with the special
problems presented by bank holding companies, some of which controlled great networks of
banks. SEN. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955), reprintedin 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 2482, 2483. In Congress' view, unrestricted growth of these financial conglomerates
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the courts have approved expansion of the activities in which banks can
engage,7 an examination of the legislative history of section 4(c)(8)
reveals that Congress did not clearly intend this result.8
This note examines the Board's interpretation of section 4(c)(8)
and concludes that the interpretation may result in several harmful
consequences.9 It does not, however, argue that reviewing courts
should intervene to force the Board to apply more rigorous standards;10
instead, Congress should review the standards and either approve or
reject them. By reviewing the Board's standards, Congress can
establish accountability and clear the uncertainty regarding the limits
of bank holding company expansion into nonbanking activities. The
note argues that, by modifying the delegation doctrine, courts coul
encourage such congressional review. 1
I. THE BOARD'S DECISION
The Bank Holding Company Act prohibits bank holding compa-
nies from controlling companies other than banks, 12 with certain stated
exemptions.13 Citicorp filed its application under the section 4(c)(8) ex-
emption, which sanctions nonbanking activities "closely related" to
banking.14 Under section 4(c)(8), if the Board determines that a pro-
threatened to create dangerous concentrations of financial power. Id The 1956 Act provided that
bank holding companies could not control nonbank subsidiaries except under exemptions
provided for by the statute. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, supra, at §4, 70 Stat. at 135-37
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1976)). One such exemption allowed nonbanking
subsidiaries engaged in activities closely related to banking. Id at § 4(cX6), 70 Stat. at 137
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976)).
The 1956 Act left a significant loophole in the scope of bank holding company regulation
because it applied only to holding companies controlling two or more banks. See Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, supra, at § 2(aX1), 70 Stat. at 133. The 1960s brought dramatic and
unrestricted growth of one-bank holding companies not covered by the act, and this alarmed
many observers. CoNF. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 5561, 5562. Congress extended regulation to one-bank holding companies by
the 1970 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. See Pub. L No. 607, § 101(a),
84 Stat. 1760, 1760 (amending section 2(aXl) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(aXl) (1976)).
7. See i.fra Parts IA & IB.
8. See in fra Part IC.
9. See infra Part IL
10. See iztfa Part III.
11. See ijfra Part IV.
12. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1976).
13. Id § 1843(c).
14. 68 Fed. Res. BulL at 505.
Section 4(c)(8) provides that holding companies may own shares of any company the
activities of which the Board after due notice and opportunity for hearing has deter-
mined (by order or regulation) to be so closely related to banking or managing or con-
trolling banks as to be a proper incident thereto. In determining whether a particular
activity is a proper incident to banking or managing or controlling banks the Board shall
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posed activity is closely related to banking and that approval will pro-
duce public benefits that outweigh possible adverse effects, it may
approve the activity.15 Both tests must be satisfied: an activity that is
not closely related to banking is not permitted even if great public ben-
efits would accrue from approval.' 6
Citicorp applied to the Federal Reserve Board for permission to
offer expanded data processing and data transmission services through
consider whether its performance by an affiliate of a holding company can reasonably be
expected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased compe-
tition, or gains in elciency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue con-
centration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interests, or
unsound banking practices. In orders and regulations under this subsection, the Board
may differentiate between activities commenced de novo and activities commenced by
the acquisition, in whole or in part, of a going concern.
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976).
The "closely related" exception originated when Congress enacted the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956. See Pub. L. No. 511, § 4(cX6), 70 Stat. 133, 137. The section was renumbered
in 1966 as section 4()(8). See Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 8(c)(8), 80 Stat. 236, 239
(amending section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956). The closely-related exemption
was significantly revised in 1970. See Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-607, § 103(8), 84 Stat. 1760, 1765 (amending section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956) (codified at 12 U.S.C.§ 1843(c)(8) (1976)). See infra Part IC for discussion of the signifi-
cance of the changes enacted by the 1970 Amendments.
15. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229,
1232 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court stated that "[t]here are two distinct issues raised by a bank
holding company's seeking to hold shares in a company engaged in non-banking activities ....
The first is whether those activities are 'closely related to banking' .... The second or so-called
'public benefits' issue, [is] derived from the 1970 Amendments to the act." Id at 1232-33.
16. The question whether a one step or a two step test was intended under the amended
section 4(c)(8) reflects the more basic disagreement over whether Congress intended the Amend-
ments to broaden the scope of the exemption. See infa Part IC for discussion of the difference of
opinion on this issue between the House and Senate Managers at the time the Amendments were
enacted.
Senator Sparkman. a proponent of the position that the exemption was broadened, main-
tained that under the revised language, activities need only be related to banking generally in
order to be a proper incident of banking. 116 CoNG. REc. 42,422, 42,424 (Amendment of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956--Conference Report to the Senate) (1970) [hereinafter cited
as SENATE MAN^AoER' REPORT]. He viewed the newly added benefits test as defining the term
"proper incident of banking," which indicates that he foresaw a meshing of the closely-related test
and the benefits test into one standard. See id at 42,424.
The majority of the House's representatives at the Conference Committee that drafted the
final version of section 4(cX8) envisioned a two step test. Their report states: "The effect of sec-
tion 4(c)(8) as a whole is to establish, in effect, two tests for the Federal Reserve Board to use in
deciding cases under section 4(cX8).... Even if the activity is found by the Board to be closely
related to banking, it must also determine whether it meets the public benefits test." CoNF. REP.
No. 1747,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprknted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5561, 5572-73
(statement of the Managers on the part of the House) [hereinafter cited as HousE MANAGERS'
REPRT].
The courts rejected attempts to mesh the tests, and the view of the House Managers has
prevailed on this point. See, ,'g., Association of Bank Travel Bureaus, Inc. v. Board of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 568-F.2d 549, 551-52 (7th Cir. 1978) and supra note 15 for the view of the
National Courer court.
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a subsidiary to be known as Citishare Corporation. 17 The Board al-
lowed Citishare to provide computer hardware and software designed
to aid check collection, securities recordkeeping, and other financial
functions;' 8 systems designed to facilitate interbank transfers of funds
and transmit financial data;19 and computer terminals for home use
that allow the customer to pay bills, receive financial information such
as stock quotations, and perform budget and accounting functions in
the home.20
A. The Fexible Closely-Related Test Applied by the Board in
Applications under Section 4(a)(8).
The Citicorp order was based on the Board's interpretation of the
closely-related test, which allows it a high degree of flexibility. The
Board finds an activity "closely related to banking" if banks have his-
torically provided the proposed service, banks generally provide serv-
ices so operationally or functionally similar to the proposed services
that they can easily provide the proposed service, or banks provide
services so integrally related to the proposed service as to require their
provision in a specialized form.21
The Board relied on each of these factors in approving the Cit-
icorp application. For example, in approving the provision of
timeshare data processing of financial, banking, and other economic
17. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull, at 505. The protestants were an association of data services
companies and six independent data services companies. Id at 505 & n.l.
After receiving Citicorp's application, the Board ruled that some of the proposed activities
were not governed by previous regulations and ordered a formal hearing. Id at 505-06. The Act
authorizes the Board to declare activities to be "closely related to banking" by regulation or by
order. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(cX8) (1976). A separate public benefits test must, however, be applied on
a case-by-case basis before an application is approved. See ifra text accompanying notes 52-53.
The Board lists activities that are closely related to banking in its Regulation Y. See 12
C.F.R. § 225A (1982). At the time of the Citicorp order, Regulation Y provided as follows:
The following activities have been determined by the Board to be so closely related to
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto:.. . (8Xi)
Providing bookkeeping or data processing services for the internal operations of the
holding company and its subsidiries and (ii) storing and processing other banking,
financial or related economic data, such as performing payroll, accounts receivable or
payable, or billing services.
Id § 225.4(a). See kLfra notes 13-15 and accompanying text for the expanded range of data
processing and transmission activities approved in the Ciicor order.
18. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. BulL at 508-09.
19. Id at 509.
20. Id at 509-10. The protestants challenged four other proposed activities: processing
financial and economic data through timesharing, providing hardware and software systems for
authentication of identifiers for electronic transmissions, selling excess capacity for any purpose,
and selling by-products of approved activities. Id at 507-08, 510-11. The Board approved each of
these activities.
21. Id at 506. Only one factor need be present for the activity to meet the test.
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data, the Board noted that banks currently utilize data processing serv-
ices in performing their own credit functions and in performing
financial bookkeeping and accounting operations for other busi-
nesses.2 2 Because banks already provide the service, the activity falls
within the first part of the three factor test. This determination was
objective: the Board based its decision on the current activities of bank
holding companies.
In contrast, the Board approved Citicorp's proposal to provide
software to banks and other financial institutions for check collection,
recordkeeping, and other financial activities because it found the pro-
posal functionally similar to the correspondent services that banking
organizations already offer.23 This determination was subjective: the
Board found that offering software to perform financial functions is
similar to the performance of such functions by a correspondent bank.
The third factor of the test, which requires that the proposed activities
be integrally related to banking activities, allows the Board similar flex-
ibility in evaluating closely relatedness.24 The second and third factors
do little either to set a certain standard for the application of section
4(c)(8) or to limit the Board's discretion.
The Board's practice of approving some activities concededly un-
related to banking by characterizing them as necessary incidental activ-
ities expands its discretion. For example, although the provision of
computer hardware did not comply with the three factor test because
providing hardware is unrelated to banking, the Board approved it.25
The Board characterized the activity as incidental to an activity that is
22. Id at 507.
23. Id at 508.
24. The Board used the third factor in approving electronic fund transfers activities. See id
at 509. The Board found that the need for security and accuracy required that these services be
allowed in a specialized form. Id
25. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 509. Why the Board found the provision of software to fall
within the three factor test of relatedness but refused to approve the provision of hardware on the
same grounds is difficult to determine. The Board found the provision of software to be function-
ally similar to services generally provided by banks; it therefore satisfied the second factor of the
test. See mpra text accompanying note 23. Further, the Board noted that hardware and software
are normally developed as an integrated package. Ci'corp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 508. The activi-
ties appear to be equally related (or unrelated) to banking.
A possible explanation for this strained reasoning is that the Board did not want to rely
excessively on the incidental activity rationale in approving the proposed services. Section 4(cX8)
does not provide for an incidental activities exception; it states simply that activities must be
closely related to banking. See supra note 14. The incidental activities rationale is a creation of
the Board, approved in limited circumstances by a reviewing court. See National Courier, 516
F.2d 1229, 1240-41. The National Courier court did not establish the limits to which the rationale
may be pushed, but struck down an attempt by the Board to employ it to approve an activity that
was not reasonably necessary to allow holding companies to engage in other activities found to be
closely related to banking. See id at 1241.
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closely related to banking. 26 Thus, the application of the test followed
by the Board in the Citicorp order results in approval of activities either
largely unrelated to banking or related only in the sense of a perceived
functional similarity.27
B. The Reaction of Reviewing Courts to the Board's Standards in
Applying Section 4(c)(8).
In past decisions reviewing the Board's application of the exemp-
tion, courts have generally accepted the Board's expansive application
of section 4(c)(8). The Board takes its three factor test for evaluating
closely relatedness from the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in National Courier Association v. Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System.28 The National Courier decision
also supports the Board's practice of approving activities unrelated to
banking as permissible incidental activities under certain conditions.29
Even the liberal National Courier court3" noted that if the Board is per-
mitted to string together an unending chain of functional and inciden-
26. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull, at 509. The Board allowed provision of hardware only so
long as the cost of hardware does not regularly exceed 30 percent of the total charge for data
services. Id
27. See supra note 25 for a discussion of approval of unrelated activities in the Citicorp order.
The approval of Citicorp's application to offer homebanking services provides a good example of
the Board's flexibility in applying the closely-related test. Approval includes authority to offer
cash management, financial information and home accounting functions. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 510. The Board approved these activities because it believed that they were functionally
similar to other services offered by banks. Id The provision of computer hardware and software
necessary to offer these services was approved under a strained combination of the incidental
activities rationale and the functionally similar factor of the three part test. See supra note 25.
The Board's formulation of standards under section 4(cX8) is flexible enough to allow ap-
proval of these activities despite the fact that banks have not offered these services in the past, and
large portions of the cost of offering the services represent the cost of provision of hardware and
software systems.
28. 516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 506.
29. See srupra note 25.
30. The National Courif court interpreted section 4(c)(8) liberally in concluding that Con-
gress intended to expand the scope of permissible nonbanking activities substantially when it en-
acted the 1970 Amendments. See 516 F.2d at 1236. InAlabamaAss'n of In Agents v. Board o/
Governors of the Fed Reserve SyA, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a conservative
interpretation of the provision, concluding that the Amendments did not significantly change the
range of the Board's discretion to approve nonbanking activities. See 533 F.2d 224, 239 (5th Cir.
1976), moifd, 558 F.2d 729 (1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
The Aazbama Ass'n court concluded that in enacting the 1970 amendments, Congress in-
tended to ratify the standards applied under the closely-related exemption of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956. See id -Nevertheless, the court approved the three factor test established
by the National Courier court. Ud at 241. The court reasoned that its review of the Board's
application of the statute should not be overly restrictive because the Board's standards under the
pre-1970 exemption provision were not particularly restrictive. Id at 239-41. The court's conclu-
sion that the pre-1970 standards were not restrictive is not supported by analysis of pre-1970
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tal relationships, the limitations of section 4(c)(8) will become
meaningless. 31 The court therefore held that the Board may not tack
one close relationship onto another indefinitely. 32
The National Courier court established a test to evaluate whether
chaining of close relationships is permissible. The court defined "hori-
zontal chaining" as provision of financial services similar to those tra-
ditionally offered by banks, and "vertical chaining" as provision of
services that are not related to banking per se, but allow banks to ex-
pand the scope of the banking-related services that they offer.33 The
court allowed vertical chaining only when necessary to facilitate hori-
zontal chaining. When vertical chaining accomplished no horizontal
expansion, it was struck down.34
The Board approved combinations of horizontal and vertical
chaining in the Citicorp order. A good example is the approval of
homebanking services.35 Homebanking can be broken down into two
activities: (1) provision of information and financial services; and (2)
provision of computer systems. The information and financial services
represent horizontal chaining because the Board found them to be
closely related to banking under the three factor test.36 The provision
of computer systems is vertical chaining because it is unrelated to bank-
ing and was approved only as an incidental activity.37 Since the
Board orders applying the exemption. The Board actually applied standards significantly more
rigorous than those applied under the three factor test. See infra note 52.
The point, however, may have been rendered moot because the Supreme Court appears to
have accepted indirectly the liberal interpretation of the National Courier court. Although the
Supreme Court noted the existence of competing interpretations of the statute, it refused to explic-
itly approve either. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450
U.S. 46, 73-74 (1981). Instead, the Court stated that the greatest deference is to be given to the
Board's application of section 4(c)(8). Id at 56. This standard of review appears to ratify the
Board's interpretation of the statute, which parallels the liberal interpretation given by the Na-
tional Courier court. See infra text accompanying notes 82-86.
31. National Courier, 516 F.2d at 1239. See infra note 34 for discussion of the court's review
of the Board's approval of courier services in the National Courier case.
32. National Courier, 516 F.2d at 1239.
33. 1Id
34. Id In National Courier, the court upheld in part and rejected in part the Board's approval
of the provision of courier services by banks. Id at 1232. The court upheld approval of courier
services in circumstances where, by offering courier services, banks could expand their financial
data processing activities. Id at 1239. The financial data processing activities represented hori-
zontal expansion because they are closely related to banking per se and the courier services repre-
sent vertical draining, because they are related to banking only in that they allow expansion of
activities closely related to banking. Id The court refused to approve courier services when they
were not necessary to facilitate the expansion of activities closely related to banking. Id at 1239-
41.
35. See supra note 27. ""
36. See supra note 27.
37. See suara note 25 and accompanying text.
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Board's approval of the provision of computer systems only makes pos-
sible the expansion of banking related activities, the approval does not
appear open to attack under the rule of National Courier, even though
the Board applied different portions of the three factor test as well as
the incidental activity justification in tandem.
National Courier allows the Board broad, flexible powers in inter-
preting section 4(c)(8), and the Citicorp order demonstrates that the
Board will not hesitate to use those powers. In order to judge whether
the flexible approach is consistent with the intent of Congress in pass-
ing section 4(c)(8), the statute's legislative history must be analyzed.
C. The Legislative History of the 1970 Amendments.
Congress amended section 4(c)(8) in 1970.38 The legislative his-
tory of the amendments reveals a deep division of opinion among the
legislators regarding the significance of the revisions to section
4(c)(8).3 9 The bills that emerged from both Houses contained language
considerably difrerent from the final version adopted by the Confer-
ence Committee, which Congress enacted into law. Both the Senate
and House versions substituted a "functionally related" test for the
closely-related standard of the 1956 Act, but the House included a list
38. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-607, § 103(8), 84 StaL
1760, 1765 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(cX8) (1976)).
39. Commentators discussed the division soon after enactment of the Amendments. See
Chase, The Emerging Fuancial Conglomerate. Liberalization of the Bank Holding CompanyAct, 60
GEo. LJ. 1225, 1238-39 (1972); Note, The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 39
GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 1200, 1217-23 (1971); Comment, Implementation of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Amendments of 1970: The Scope of Banking Activities, 71 MIcn. L REv. 1170 (1973).
The 1970 Amendments did not effect a great change of language from the original closely-
related exemption enacted as part of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. See supra note 14
for a discussion of the history of the closely-related exemption.
The changes effected by the 1970 Amendments include the elimination of the introductory
clause referring to "financial, fiduciary or insurance" activities. This change was not intended to
effect a substantive change in the test but to eliminate redundant language. HOUSE MANAGERS'
REPORT, supra note 16, at 14-15, 1970 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEWS at 5565-66.
The effect of the elimination of the reference to the "business of banking" was relied on by
the Senate Managers to the Conference Committee who argued that the Amendments were in-
tended to broaden and liberalize the closely-related exemption. Senator Sparkman stated that
even if the closely-related language was retained, liberalization of the provision would be
achieved by eliminating the "business of banking" language. SENATE MANAGERS' REORT, supra
note 16, at 42, 424.
The 1970 House Managers' Report, however, states that this change was intended only to
make clear that a proposed activity need not relate " 'to the specific business carried on by the
subsidiary banks of the particular holding company involved.'" House MANAGERS' RMEORT,
supra note 16, at 16, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News it 5567. Under the House view, the
substance of the 1956 closely-related test was to remain intact. Id at 21, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& Ait. NzEWS at 5572.
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of prohibited activities as well.40 The Conference Committee had great
difficulty reaching a compromise between the House and Senate bills.41
The Senate Conferees refused to accept the restrictive list of prohibited
activities contained in the House bill.42 The Committee settled the is-
sue by striking the list of prohibited activities and reinserting the old
"closely related" language for the new "functionally related" lan-
guage.43 After the Conference Committee adjourned, the House and
Senate Managers issued reports clearly demonstrating that dramatic
differences in the views of the legislators remained even as the revised
version of section 4(c)(8) was enacted.
The Senate Managers' Report states that Congress intended the
Amendments to free the Board from restrictive precedents established
under the old act.44 Senator Bennett stated that the Committee's ver-
sion of section 4(c)(8) maintains the maximum flexibility for the Fed-
eral Reserve Board called for by the Senate's original bill.45 At the
other extreme, the House Managers' Report states that the Conference
Committee rejected attempts to liberalize the closely-related exemption
and agreed to maintain the closely-related test of the 1956 Act.46 As
one commentator stated, evaluating this legislative history requires "an
40. See SEN. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Ses. 12 (1970), reprhwed in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONo. & AD. NEws 5519, 5530, H.R. REP. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. 9 (1969).
41. HOUSE MANAoERS' REPORT, supra note 16, at 13, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5564.
42. See i at 13, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5564.
43. See id at 13-14, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5564.
44. SENATE MANAGERS' REPORT, xipra note 16, at 42,424.
45. Id at 42,432 (statement of Senator Bennett). Senator Bennett added that he considered
the House interpretation of the bill to misconstrue the Conference Committee's decision. Zd In
approving the original Senate bill, the Senate Committee supported substitution of a new func-
tionally related test as a means of increasing the Board's flexibility in dealing with applications to
offer nonbank services. SEN. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5519, 5530-33. Under this more flexible approach, the Senators fore-
saw Board approval of a wide range of nonbank activities such as acting as travel agents, leasing
equipment, and providing data services. Id at 13, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5532.
The Senate viewed flexibility as desirable because it would allow approval of activities necessary
for banks to compete effectively and maintain their profitability in the face of emerging changes in
the financial industry. Id at 13-14, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 5532.
46. HOUSE MANAoERS' REPORT, supra note 16, at 21, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5572. Therefore, the House Managers intended to ratify the standards used by the Board in
applying the exemption prior to the 1970 Amendments. Their report states that expansion or
liberalization of the provision was not justified. Id at 21, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at
5572.
Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, the Board construed the closely related pro-
vision to permit only those nonbanking activities that were so intimately tied with banking opera-
tions as to be a reasonably required part of the banking business. Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed.
Res. Bull. 1014, 1029 (1957). The Board required more than a showing of common traits, which
appears to be sufficient under current standards. See supra note 27 for discussion of the approval
of homebanking activities based on similarities to activities engaged in by banks and the inciden-
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almost 'intuitive' assessment of motives and intentions."47  In any case,
the House Managers' Report demonstrates that some members of Con-
gress did not intend to liberalize the closely-related test of the 1956
Act.48
II. THE PUBLIC BENEFITS TEST
As the Citicorp order demonstrates, the Federal Reserve Board has
chosen to adopt the liberal view of the Senate Managers. 49 The Board's
tal activities rationale. Under the Transamerica order, relatedness demonstrated by kindred char-
acteristics was not controlling. 43 Fed. Res. Bull, at 1029.
Otto Bremer Co., 46 Fed. Res. Bull. 621 (1960), provides an example of the Board's
preamendment test. The Board approved retention of an insurance subsidiary, but only after
noting that the insurance activities had been carried on by the small local bank for over fifty years.
Id at 622. Further, all insurance activities were conducted by bank employees who had banking
duties, the insurance was sold only in the bank's building, and 99 percent of all sales were made to
bank customers. I1d at 622-23. The Board emphasized the necessity of the traditional connection
of the insurance activities to the bank's operations and the intermingling of banking and insurance
activities. Id at 623.
The Board continued to require these stringent indicia of relatedness throughout the pro-1970
Amendment period. In Senate Hearings before adoption of the Amendments, Arthur Bums
stated:
Virtually all of the subsidiaries established under section 4(c)(8) have been insurance
compames or agencies. Where an insurance agency is involved, the Board has inter-
preted the provision as requiring a 'direct and significant connection' between the activi-
ties of the agency and those of subsidiary banks. The connection may be established, for
example, by the fact that the insurance agency will be housed in bank offices and use
bank personnel, or that its income will be derived from bank related transactions or
insurance sold to bank customers.
Hearings on S1052, S.1211, S.1664, S3823 andHA 677& Bfore the Senate Comndttee on Bank-
Ingandthe Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sss. 141 (1970)(statement of Arthur Bums). Burns' language
parallels that used by the House Managers, who stated that section 4(c)(8) applies only if there is a
direct and significant connection between the proposed activities and the current activities of
banks. HousE MANAGERS' REPORT, suara note 16, at 21, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
5572.
47. Note, supra note 39, at 1223. For instance, Representative Widnall argued against the
position of the House Managers and noted that only four of the seven House Conferees signed the
restrictive House Managers' Report that denied the Board additional flexibility under the exemp-
tion provision. 116 CoNG. Rac. 41,949, 41,954 (conference report on H.R. 6778, Bank Holding
Company Act Amendments) (1970).
In addition, Senator Proxmire, a Senate Conferee, rejected the liberal position of the Senate
Managers, stating that the Conference Committee agreed essentially to retain the standards ex-
isting under the 1956 Act. SENATE MANAG S' REoRTsupra note 16, 116 CONo. REc. at 42,427.
He argued that liberalization of the provision was not justified. Id at 42,428.
48. InAssociat'on of Bank Travel Bureaus, Inc. . BoardoGovernors ofthe Fed Reserve Sys.,
the petitioner argued against the court's reliance on the House Managers' Conference Report be-
cause it was signed by only four of the twelve members of the Conference Committee. See 568
F.2d 549, 552 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1978). The court rejected this argument, noting that under the rules
then in effect, only the House Conferees had the right to prepare the report, and the four signa-
tures constituted a majority of a possible seven House members entitled to sign the report. Id
49. In approving homebanking activities, the Board relied on functional similarities between
the proposed activities and activities currently engaged in by banks. See Jupra note 27. The
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action may not present difficulties, however, because section 4(c)(8)
provides a second test, the public benefits test, which the Board must
apply.50 The Senators justified expansion of the scope of the exemp-
tion, in part, by noting that the addition of the public benefits test
would help to guard against adverse effects.51 In theory, application of
the two part test should result in approval of only those activities that
provide net benefit to the public. If so, liberalization of the exemption
provision does not pose great danger to the public. This justification
for liberalization is acceptable only if the public benefits test can be
applied accurately. The analysis that follows demonstrates that the
public benefits test can not be applied with any high degree of
accuracy.
A. The Board's Decision Under the Public Benefts Test.
The Board may declare an activity to be closely related to banking
by regulation,52 but the public benefits test requires the Board to scruti-
nize each application for potential benefits or detriments to the public
before it allows a holding company to engage in a nonbank activity.53
Although the statute clearly specifies potential benefits and adverse fac-
functional similarities approach reflects the views of the Senators who wished to broaden the
exemption by granting the Board increased flexibility. See supra note 45.
The House Managers explicitly rejected the functionally related approach to applying the
exemption. HOUSE MANAGERS' REPORT, supra note 16, at 21, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws at 5572. See supra note 46 for discussion of the more stringent standards envisioned by the
House Managers.
50. The dangers that section 4(c)(8) was intended to guard against include the potential for
unfair competition and concentrations in our economy. See infra Part II for discussion of the risk
of the anticompetitive practice of tying and supra note 6 for discussion of the policy of separating
banking and commercial activities to prevent undue concentrations of economic power.
51. The Senate Report notes testimony that inclusion of the public benefits test will help
guard against risks to competition resulting from liberalization of the closely related test. SEN.
REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5519,
5532.
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976). Allowing determination of closely-relatedness by regula-
tion is sensible because the factors considered in reaching the conclusion under this test are of
industry-wide scope. See Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 516 F.2d 1206, 1215 & n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Under the three factor test for closely-related-
ness, evidence is considered that demonstrates that banks generally provide the service, that the
service is functionally related to services generally offered by banks, and that the service is inte-
grally related to services offered by banks generally. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
This evidence is drawn from the banking system as a whole and not from fact situations particular
to any individual holding company. Such broad based factual determinations are determinations
of legislative facts and are properly determined by rules with a broad prospective application. Id
at 1212 nn.26 & 29.
53. Id at 1216. Under the benefits test, the Board must find that the performance of the
proposed activity can be expected to produce public benefits, such as convenience, efficiency, and
increased competition, that outweigh adverse factors such as undue concentrations of resources,
unfair competition, or unsound banking practices. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976). These are issues
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tors to be considered by the Board,54 the test is difficult to apply be-
cause the Board often lacks information necessary to make an accurate
decision. The Board must predict what effects approval will have in a
complex economic setting. An illustration is the Board's analysis of the
potential adverse effects of voluntary tying arising from approval of
Citicorp's application.55
Voluntary tying occurs when a customer believes that he can more
easily obtain a scarce product (such as bank credit) if he voluntarily
accepts other products (such as the bank's data services) from the same
seller, rather than seeking these products in the market.5 6 In the con-
text of banking, voluntary tying occurs because bank customers have
great incentives to remain in the good graces of their banker.5 7 When
credit is tight, banks have the power to allocate funds, and58 because
there is limited competition in the industry, banks may allocate credit
to the best customer, not to the highest bidder.5 9 Customers may seek
best-customer status by buying other bank services, which leads di-
rectly to the voluntary tying problem.w
Voluntary tying is, as the Board notes, a structural problem based
on the nature of competition in banking markets.61 Because govern-
ment regulation creates the necessary climate for voluntary tying, and
because regulated firms can reap benefits from it at the expense of com-
petitive firms, the government should attempt to find equitable solu-
tions respecting the interests of consumers and nonbank businesses
before allowing bank holding companies to expand into new markets. 62
The Board in Citicorp concluded that the competitive market for com-
mercial loans will preclude voluntary tying.63 The Board reasoned that
a consumer would feel no compulsion to buy a bank's data services in
of adjudicative fact that depend on the particular characteristics and situation of the applicant,
and may not be determined by regulation. Independent BankerssA'n, 516 F.2d at 1216.
54. See supra note 53.
55. Tying is an adverse effect on competition that Congress believed should be considered in
applying the benefits test. See SEN. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CoDE CoNe. & AD. NEws 5519, 5535.
56. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. BulL at 511.
57. See Competion in the Computer and Data Procesig Induffry and Its Effect on Small
Busnsj Hearings Before the Subcommittee onAntitnwn and Restraint of TradeActivites Affecting
SmalU Burine.r of ik House Committee on SmallBusiness, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1981) (state-
ment of Albert Foer, Federal Trade Commission) [hereinafter cited as 1981 House Hearings.j
58. Id
59. Id
60. See Id
61. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 511.
62. See 1981 House Hearing, s pra note 57, at 21 (statement of Albert Foer, Federal Trade
Commission).
63. Cicorp, 68 Fed. Res. BulL at 512.
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order to obtain credit or other bank services. The customer could sim-
ply obtain credit from a competitor not offering data services. 64
The Board's analysis is incomplete; tying could become a great
problem if all banks begin to offer data services. Banks tend to follow
an innovative leader's entry into new fields of activity.65 Assuming that
the Board does not intend to give Citicorp exclusive rights to offer ex-
panded data services, such services will probably be offered by many
banks in the future. The Board's argument that competition will pre-
vent voluntary tying is invalid if this occurs.
The Board notes in Citicorp that it is not required to insure against
every hypothetical adverse contingency connected with a proposal.66
Admittedly, the increased risk of voluntary tying that would attend
large-scale entry by banks into newly authorized activities is hypotheti-
cal, but the risk is nonetheless significant.67 The protesters depend on
64. Id
65. For example, approximately 25 banks were using or testing home banking systems by the
end of 1982. Padilla, Home-Banking Tests Begin in a Few Places, but the New Systems May Be
Slow to Spread, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1983, at 25, col 4.
66. C icorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull, at 511.
67. The failure to account for the risk of tying also produced mistakes in other parts of the
Board's reasoning. For instance, the Board noted that a significant benefit of Citicorp's entry into
new areas in the data services industry is that the entry would be de novo. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res.
Bull. at 513. The statute allows the Board to favor de novo entry. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1976). In the Citicorp order, the Board states that it presumes de novo entry to be procompetitive
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 513. The anticompetitive effect of
tying represents a real risk to the competitive conditions in the data services industry. By failing
to accept this risk, the Board fails to consider evidence contrary to its presumption that pro-com-
petitive benefits will flow from de novo entry.
The risk of allowing banks to enter the data processing market is significant. Generally, entry
of regulated firms into a competitive industry presents a risk of suppression of competition and
eventual dominance by the regulated firms. See 1981 House Hearings, supra note 57, at 18 (state-
ment of Albert Foer, Federal Trade Commission). These risks accrue because regulated firms
have special advantages over unregulated firms, such as protection from competition in their regu-
lated markets, government-granted economic power over vital products (such as credit), and gov-
ernment control of their pricing mechanisms (such as regulation of interest rates paid on deposits).
See id at 19.
Independent data services companies argued that allowing regulated bank holding companies
to enter the data services industry would result in the banks' eventual domination of the industry.
See Ad at 50-51 (testimony of John Reardon). These companies were concerned with the potential
for tying; banks are able to offer their banking services along with data processing services, yet
barriers to entry into the banking industry prevent the data service companies from offering this
combination. See id at 52-54 (testimony of Mr. Reardon and Mr. Chaffin). This advantage al-
lows holding companies to take the business of independent data service companies not because of
superior price, quality, or delivery, but rather, because their customers need credit and think that
buying data services from a bank may help them get it. Id at 3 (testimony of Mr. Chaffin).
Study of conditions existing in industries that have been open for bank holding company
entry for some time indicates that the fear of independent processors is not baseless. The mort-
gage banking and consumer finance industries have been particularly attractive targets for holding
company entry, and bank holding companies have already become powerful, if not dominant in
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access to the market place for their survival. Should a significant por-
tion of the financial, business, and home computer markets become
tied to other bank services, the independent companies would be jeop-
ardized. Yet the Board failed to consider this risk because the line of
inquiry required is speculative.68
The problem is exacerbated because competitors often have no
way to correct the Board's errors in judgment. Nonbank competitors
are often unable to use antitrust remedies until they have been severely
damaged,69 and in the case of voluntary tying, antitrust remedies are
not available at all.
[Ihf the tying is truly voluntary, with no coercion on the part of the
regulated entity, there is no antitrust violation. Likewise, there is no
conduct for regulators to monitor, making traditional regulatory
scrutiny an ineffective response.... Nor is it sufficient to respond
that regulators need not worry so long as consumers are merely mak-
ing voluntary choices in the marketplace. Although the antitrust laws
may not be violated by voluntary tying, the consequences may bejust as harmful to competitors and consumers as unlawful coercive
tying--competitiors are foreclosed from part of a market for reasons
unrelated to the competitive merits of their product.70
In justifying its decision in Citicorp, the Board noted that the data
processing services industry presently has a large number of firms and
low barriers to entry.71 Admittedly, not every case of bank holding
company expansion into nonbanking activities threatens competition.
In some cases, banks are responding to invasions of their own industry
by strong institutions from other regulated industries72. Reducing the
both of these industries. Rhoades, Aggregate Concentration: An Emerging Isue in Bank Merger
Policy, 24 ANTxTusr BuL. 1, 10-11 (1979).
68. Similar problems are inherent in agency attempts to resolve issues involving complex
predictions of future effects in adjudicatory proceedings.
[S]ince the adjudicator is purporting to decide only the case before him, he may be less
concerned with the long-run consequences of the decision or of a series of decisions. The
focus on 'Justice in the individual case" does not lend itself to intelligent forward plan-
ning, to rational consideration of major options and alternatives, and to a concern for the
aggregate effects of individualized decisions.
Cramton, A Comment On Trid- ) oe Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585,
590 (1972).
69. 1981 House Heaings, supra note 57, at 107 (testimony of A. Bidde).
70. Id at 21 (testimony of Albert Foer, Federal Trade Commission). See generally P.
AREFDA, AN mRusT ANALYsis 541 (1981).
The Board provides no significant protections against voluntary tying. The Board simply
notes that data services will be marketed under the name "Citishare" instead of "Citicorp" and
that no proof of tying activities engaged in by Citicorp in the past was presented. Citicorp, 68 Fed.
Res. BulL at 512.
71. Citicorp, 68 Fed. Res. Bull, at 512.
72. "Less regulated institutions have moved promptly to provide new services, often in direct
competition with traditional depository institutions. Every week brings new competitors to this
national financial marketplace." LaFalce, Banking in the Eighties, 37 Bus. LAw. 839, 839 (1982).
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restrictions on nonbanking activities in these cases allows banks to re-
spond to such challenges.7 3
This suggests that factors beyond those called for under either the
closely-related test or the public benefits test should be considered. If
the industry to be entered by bank holding companies is a regulated
industry, the presumption that de novo entry is pro-competitive may be
justified.7 4 Entry in these cases may be warranted, especially if institu-
tions in the nonbanking industry to be entered are making significant
inroads into the banking industry. The Citicorp order, however, per-
mits entry into competitive industries whose members cannot enter the
banking field. They cannot hope to enjoy the benefits of tying their
services to banking services that may naturally accrue to bank holding
companies.
Allowing entry in this case, when the regulated competitors could
dominate the market, demonstrates the problems of applying a mean-
ingful benefits test. Because the Board disfavors speculation, such risks
as voluntary tying, are not factored into the benefits equation, and are
not adequately protected against. 5 Even if the Board adopts a policy
of considering such risks, section 4(c)(8) does not say how much weight
should be given'to any particular benefit or adverse factor. The test
leaves the Board great discretion and fails to guarantee that approval of
an activity will produce net public benefits. In light of these problems,
the Board's liberalization of the closely-related test presents dangers,
and the Board has made its decision to adopt a liberal standard without
a clear mandate from Congress.76 How, then, should a reviewing court
react when faced with a challenge to a Board order approving an appli-
cation under section 4(c)(8) based on the Board's flexible standard?
III. THE LIMITED ROLE OF THE COURTS IN SETTING STANDARDS
FOR APPLICATION OF THE CLOSELY-RELATED TEST.
By statute, the Federal Reserve Board's findings of fact are subject
to judicial review under the substantial evidence standard.77 Under
73. "If nondepositoxy institutions are to be allowed to compete with banks in functions long
associated with depository institutions, then, many argue, certain depository institutions should be
permitted to compete in areas long associated with the securities industry." Id at 846.
74. See supra note 67.
75. Developing methods to guard against voluntary tying is difficult, and no certain solution
to the problem exists. See 1981 House Hearings, supra note 57, at 21 (statement of Albert Foer,
Federal Trade Commission).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
77. Courts must uphold the Board's findings of fact if the findings are supported by substan-
tial evidence. 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1976). The substantial evidence standard for review of Board
orders is identical to the standard provided by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
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this standard, the court will consider only supporting evidence explic-
itly noted by the Board,78 but if the Board notes evidence that a reason-
able person might accept as adequate .to support the Board's
conclusions, the court must uphold the Board's findings. 7 9 The court
may not reverse, even if its own conclusion is "diametrically
opposite".80
Despite the deference accorded agency findings of fact, the Board's
flexibility in applying the closely related test could be substantially re-
stricted if the court interpreted section 4(c)(8) narrowly. The court has
this power because the proper definition of the statutory phrase
"closely-related" is a question of law, not fact."' Although the court
can reverse the Board's interpretation of the statute, whether it should
use this power or defer to the Board's interpretation requires careful
consideration.
The Supreme Court elected the course of deference in Board o/
Governors of Federal Reserve System v. Investment Co. Institute and re-
fused to establish an authoritative interpretation of section 4(c)(8).82
The Court approved the Board's liberal interpretation indirectly, stat-
ing that courts must give the Board's interpretation of the closely-re-
§ 706(2)(E) (1976), for review of formal agency adjudications. Independent Banke: Ass'n, 516
F.2d at 1217.
78. Mercantile Tex. Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 638 F.2d 1255, 1260
(5th Cir. 1981).
79. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 253
(1978). As a practical guide, the Board's findings of fact appear to be most vulnerable when they
diverge from the fiadings made by the administrative law judge. C Florida Ass'n of Ins. Agents
v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 591 F.2d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1979) ("where the Board
differs with the administrative law judge without clearly explaining its reasons for disagreement,
the Board's finding will be 'vulnerable' on review.").
80. Alabama Aas of Ina= Agents, 533 F.2d at 246. In contrast to review of Board orders,
judicial review of Board regulations is made under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard for in-
formal rulemaking. The Board's regulations are issued under informal rulemaking procedures
because 12 U.S.C. § 1843(cX8), the statute authorizing the Board's rulemaking power in applying
the exemption, does not require that regulations be made on the record. See Association of Bank
Travel Bureaus, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 568 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir.
1978). The standard of review for informal rulemaking is provided for under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (1976).
81. See National Courier, 516 F.2d at 1236. In reviewing Board regulations under the arbi-
trary-and-capricious standard, the proper definition of the term "closely related" is a question of
law, to be determined by the court. Id at 1235-36. The same principle applies in reviewing orders
under the substantial evidence standard. For example, in interpreting a statute providing for lim-
ited review of findings of fact by the National Labor Relations Board, the court noted that dis-
putes relating to the meaning of the statutory term present questions of law not governed by the
statute. NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 590 (2d Cir. 1961); see also NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 290 (1965) ("courts are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their
affrmance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate").
82. 450 U.S. 46, 73-74 (1980).
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lated test great deference.8 3 The Court noted that the Board's expertise
in the technical field of banking exceeds that of the courts, and decided
that the Board is better able to interpret its statute.84 The Court indi-
cated that it would defer to the Board's decisions unless they were un-
reasonable or clearly incorrect.85 Under this test, a reviewing court has
little power to intervene to alter the standards under which the Board
applies the exemption. Because the Senate Managers supported liber-
alization of the exemption by granting more flexibility to the Board,86
the Board's flexible standard is not an unreasonable interpretation of
congressional intent.
Strong practical considerations support the Court's view that the
Board's interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference. First, con-
sider the consequences of a court decision implementing the House
Managers' interpretation of section 4(c)(8).87 The problem with this
83. Seeid at 56.
84. The Court cited the following comments of Justice Rutledge:
Not only because Congress has committed the system's operation to their hands, but also
because the system itself is a highly specialized and technical one, requiring expert and
coordinated management in all its phases, I think their judgment should be conclusive
upon any matter which, like this one, is open to reasonable difference of opinion. Their
specialized experience gives them an advantage judges cannot possibly have, not only in
dealing with the problems raised for their discretion by the system's working, but also in
ascertaining the meaning Congress had in mind in prescribing the standards by which
they should administer it. Accordingly their judgment in such matters should be over-
turned only where there is no reasonable basis to sustain it or where they exercise it in a
manner which clearly exceeds their statutory authority.
Id at 56 n.21.
85. Id at 56-58 & nn.20-23. Courts often accept administrative interpretations of statutes
when statutory terms are not defined by Congress. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the
Court approved the agency's interpretation of the term "employee" after determining that the
agency's definition was consistent with the statutory purpose and that Congress had not attempted
to define the term. See 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
An important difference exists between section 4(c)(8) and the statute in Hearst. The Hearst
Court found a clear statement of congressional policy against which it could measure the agency's
interpretation for consistency. See id at 126-29. The division of opinion among the Congressmen
who enacted section 4(c)(8) makes it impossible to say whether the Board's interpretation of the
statutory term "closely related" is consistent with congressional policy. Judicial deference in this
case gives rise to problems of lack of accountability and uncontrolled administrative discretion.
See infra Part IV.
86. See supra note 45.
87. The House Managers attempted to retain the standards applied under the 1956 Act. See
suapra note 46 for discussion of the standards under the 1956 Act.
As an alternative to attempting to apply the House's interpretation of the statute, a court
could declare the legislative history of section 4(c)(8) to be hopelessly ambiguous and rely on the
technique of literal interpretation to construe the statute. The current trend in statutory interpre-
tation appears to be toward "a literalist reading of statutory terms as a surrogate for actual legisla-
tive intent" when the legislative history is silent or ambiguous. Note, Intent, Clear Staements, and
the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L Rav. 892, 894 &
n.21 (1982).
The Board approved the Administrative Law Judge's application of the technique of literal
interpretation in the 7)ansamedica order, the resulting interpretation of the exemption provision
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judicial intervention is that it would not make the application of section
4(c)(8) more consistent with legislative intent. The revised standard
would be consistent with the views of the House Managers, but would
directly conflict with those of the Senate Managers who supported a
flexible test and intended the 1970 Amendments to enact such a test.88
No single standard, whether imposed by a court or the Board, can give
effect to the divergent views expressed in the legislative history of sec-
tion 4(c)(8). Intervention by the courts to impose new standards on the
Board is likely to make matters worse. As the Court noted, the Board's
expertise in the field of banking, built through years of regulation, out-
weighs that of the courts.8 9 The Board relies on this expertise to estab-
lish workable standards in the face of Congress' inability to agree on
the proper standards to govern the application of section 4(c)(8). 90 Be-
cause courts lack practical experience in regulating banks, they are in a
poor position to judge whether another standard will prove to be supe-
rior. Congress has only a limited amount of time to devote to the nu-
merous policy questions it faces. In cases of great internal division,
practicality may dictate that the process of standard setting be left, at
least for a time, to an agency.91 Professor Davis notes that this flexible
tool allows building of standards through an agency's application of a
statute.92 By applying standards and measuring results, the agency is
able to establish rational guidelines under the statute. In light of these
was that nonbanking activities must be a reasonably required part of the banking business. See
supra note 46.
88. See supra note 45.
89. Expertise has been used to justify delegating discretion to the agency by enactment of
statutes with imprecise standards. For example, in Fahey v. Malonee, the Court noted that be-
cause banking is one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of public callings, regu-
lators have a great deal of expertise. 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947). This factor may allow a discretion
to make regulations in areas of expertise that might not be upheld in unfamiliar fields. Id
90. The Supreme Court deferred to the Board's standards because the Board's expertise can
"enlighten and rationalize the search for the meaning and intent of Congress." Board of Governors
v. Invesiment Co. Ins., 450 U.S. at 68 (quoting Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628
(1971)(1). In fact, the Board's expertise cannot aid it in understanding the intent of Congress
because in this case the Houses were in direct conflict over the purpose of the amended provision,
and no single congressional intent exists. Nevertheless, the Board's expertise gives it an advantage
over courts in attempting to develop workable standards in the absence of a legislative purpose.
91. See I K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 155-56 (1978). In Yakus . United
States, the Court noted that the Constitution does not require Congress to find every fact and
make every determination on its own as a prerequisite to legislative action. 321 U.S. 414, 424
(1944). Instead, so long as it sufficiently marks the limits of the administrator's field of action,
Congress has fulfilled its duty. See id at 425.
92. Davis suggests that if Congress fails to prescribe the required standards for discretionary
action in a statute, administrators should be allowed to satisfy the requirement by prescribing
them within a reasonable time. K. DAviS, supra note 91, at 211. Standards adopted through ad-
ministrative rulemaking are just as effective in confining and guiding the discretionary determina-
tion as standards stated in a statute. fId
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practical considerations, the best course of action for the courts is to
defer to the standards set by the Board in the application of section
4(c)(8).
The conclusion that courts are justified in refusing to impose new
standards to govern the application of section 4(c)(8) does not suggest
that the Board's standards should not be scrutinized and perhaps al-
tered. The Board's flexible standards deviate from the standards envi-
sioned by the House Managers. The Board made an important policy
decision in adopting its flexible standard, and the effects on the public
and nonbank competitors could be serious if the policy choice proves
unwise.93 A fundamental notion of our democratic system is that im-
portant policy choices should be made by law makers accountable to
the electorate, and the Board is subject to no such accountability. 94
Congress should review the standards established by the Board in
order to restore accountability to the electorate in the application of
section 4(c)(8). Congress is responsible for making law, and the onus of
legitimizing, altering, or rejecting the Board's flexible standards must
fall on Congress. The courts should intervene, not by setting standards,
but by encouraging Congress to fulfill this duty. By revising the delega-
tion doctrine, the courts would encourage Congress to review the
Board's standards.
IV. THE DUTY OF CONGRESS TO REVIEW THE BOARD'S FLEXIBLE
APPROACH IN APPLYING SECTION 4(c)(8)
According to Judge Skelly Wright, "[w]hen Congress is too di-
vided or uncertain to articulate policy, it is no doubt easier to pass an
organic statute with some vague language about the 'public interest'
which tells the agency, in effect, to get the job done."95 Congress' ap-
proach to the revision of section 4(c)(8) in the 1970 Amendments sup-
ports this observation.96 Although section 4(c)(8) directs the Board to
examine the relationship between banking and nonbanking activities,
the split in Congress over the meaning of "closely related" gives the
93. See supra Part IL
94. See infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
95. Wright, Beyond DiScretionary Jurtice (Book Review), 81 YALE L.J. 575, 584-85 (1972).
96. In drafling section 4(c)(8), Congress faced the difficult policy choice of whether to liber-
alize the closely-related exemption, risking concentrations in the financial sector and harm to non-
bank competitors, in order to gain possible public benefits of convenience, efficiency and more
competitive banks. In the end, Congress remained deadlocked on the issue, and the Board made
the policy decision. The Amendments enacted the public benefits test, but this restriction amounts
to little more than what Judge Wright calls "vague language about the 'public interest.'" See
supra Part II for criticism of the public benefits test.
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Board complete discretion to define the required relationship broadly
or narrowly.97
The Supreme Court defers to the Board's judgment in applying
the closely related provision because of the Board's expertise.98 Al-
though the Court's position is justified, Judge Wright notes a problem
with this process: "An argument for letting the experts decide when the
people's representatives are uncertain or cannot agree is an argument
for paternalism and against democracy." 99 He notes that in some cases,
the agency will formulate standards and establish guidelines for its ac-
tions,'00 as the Federal Reserve Board has done in interpreting section
4(c)(8). Judge Wright cautions that in such cases, standards and policy
are set at the expense of democratic decisiomaking.Ol Professor Da-
vis agrees at least that agencies "should not have unguided and uncon-
trolled discretionary power to govern as they see fit." 1o2 Yet the
Supreme Court's rationale for adopting a policy of deference to stan-
dards set by the Board is persuasive. The question presented, then, is
how to preserve the benefits of standard-setting by the Board without
unduly sacrificing democratic processes.
Professor Davis answers this question by proposing a recast dele-
gation doctrine under which flexibility and accountability can be main-
tained through a two step process: courts should require administrators
to establish rules and standards to guide their discretionary determina-
tions, and Congress should supervise major policymaking by agen-
97. Judge Wright called for reevaluation of the delegation doctrine in extreme cases in which
statutes governing agency discretion contain only vague language about the public interest. See
Wright, supra note 95, at 584-85.
The delegation doctrine (or nondelegation doctrine) requires a court to strike down statutes
that attempt to confer powers that Congress cannot delegate. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S 388, 430 (1935) ("in every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has
recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to tran-
scend"). The doctrine is grounded on the principle that the separation of powers established by
the Constitution places limits on the exercise of legislative power by non-elected officials such as
administrators. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672-75
(1980)(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine to strike down delegations of power to govern-
mental organizations in only two cases: A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINIs-
TRATIVE LAW TEaTisE 151 (1978). The doctrine has fallen into disuse and may no longer be
viable. See id at 149-52, bu see i.f'a note 109.
Section 4(c)(8) appears to satisfy the requirements of the delegation doctrine as traditionally
formulated. See infra note 109. Nevertheless, the statute presents a strong case for application of a
recast delegation doctrine based on the premise that if Congress delegates standard setting to
agencies, it should review the standards established. See infra text accompanying notes 105-108.
98. See spua text accompanying notes 82-86.
99. Wright, supra note 95, at 585.
100. Id at 585-86.
101. Id at 586.
102. See I K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE 206 (1978).
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cies.10 3 By reviewing standards set by agencies, Congress can either
accept responsibility for the agency's decisions by approving them or
reject the standards as unjustified.10 4
At present, Congress has little incentive to undertake such a re-
view on its own initiative. By leaving the decisionmaking process
solely to the Board, Congress is able to avoid responsibility for any
adverse consequences that may result from the Board's policies. By
altering the delegation doctrine to provide incentives for congressional
review,105 the benefits of standard-setting by agencies can be achieved
without sacrificing accountability. Congress would be allowed to dele-
gate the process of standard-setting, but courts would be charged with
the responsibility of taking action to encourage legislative review of the
standards established if Congress fails to undertake review on its own
initiative.106
The current conditions surrounding the application of section
4(c)(8) present a strong case for application of a remodeled delegation
doctrine. The division among the legislators granted the Board com-
plete discretion to choose either rigorous or flexible standards in apply-
103. Id
104. The essence of the notion that policymaking should be supervised by those accountable
to the electorate was expressed by Senator Paul Douglas:
[Tihe American people have never been willing to confide their individual or collective
destinies to civil servants over whom they have little control. They distrust and dislike a
self-perpetuating bureaucracy, because they believe that ultimately it will not reflect the
best interest of the people. They therefore turn to their elected representatives to protect
their legitimate interests in their relationships with public administrators. The people
feel that this is part of a legislator's duties, as indeed it is, and if a legislator washes his
hands of any such responsibility, he may expect very soon to be retired to private life.
P. DouoiAs, ETmIcs IN GovERNamr 87-88 (1952).
105. The delegation doctrine as traditionally formulated was intended to encourage Congress
to include standards in statutes enacted. Justice Rehnquist views the doctrine as having three
purposes: (1) to ensure that Congress makes important policy choices, (2) to ensure that agencies
receiving authority from Congress are guided by intelligible standards in the exercise of their
discretion, and (3) to provide standards against which courts may check agency actions for abuse
of authority. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). This formulation emphasizes Congress' duty to provide standards at
the time a statute is enacted in order to guide agencies and reviewing courts.
Professor Davis argues that this emphasis on standard setting caused the doctrine to fall into
disuse. See 1 K. DAvIs, ADMImSTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 150-57 (1978). Rigorous application of
the doctrine would limit agency flexibility to arrive at workable standards through application of a
statute.
106. The more drastic means by which a court could encourage legislative review is to refuse
to allow the Board to apply the exemption provision until Congress acts. An alternative technique
is to refuse to review Board orders or regulations applying the statute for anything more than
compliance with procedural requirements until Congress clarifies the purpose of section 4(c)(8).
Judicial review of agency .actions for compliance with their enabling statutes is necessary to legiti-
mize the agencies' authority, and therefore'this tactic could be equally effective in prompting
congressional review.
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ing the provision. The Board opted for flexible standards that
broadened the exemption, and Congress may now review the results of
that policy decision. In addition, Congress and the courts should be
especially sensitive to the problem of lack of accountability, because
the Board is closely tied to the interests of banks. Its members interact
constantly with members of the banking industry, and nonbank com-
petitors may justifiably wonder whether the Federal Reserve Board is
truly an impartial policymaker in weighing their interests against those
of the banks. 0 7 The Board was a major force behind the move to
broaden and liberalize the closely-related provision in the 1970
Amendments. 08 It is not surprising that the Board used the division in
legislative intent to proceed with liberalization on its own. Despite
these concerns, courts have no tool other than the delegation doctrine
with which to encourage Congress to undertake review of the Board's
standards. 109 Modifying the doctrine to encourage or require Congres-
sional review of standard-setting by agencies would give courts the
107. See Professor Cramton notes that programs and policy goals within an agency may make
impartial adjudication difficult. Cramton, snpra note 68, at 589.
108. Board Chairmen Martin and Burns, as well as various Nixon administration officials,
"strongly and repeate4ly urged that a new, broader test be adopted." HOUSE MANAOERS' RE-
PORT, supra note 16, at 19-20, repintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5570-71. Their
position was rejected by the House Managers. See id at 21, reprntedhi 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 5572.
109. Professor Davis argues that the traditional delegation doctrine has been a complete fail-
ure and is no longer viable. See I K. DAvis, AtMmisTRAnVE LAw TnAISE 150-52 (1978).
However, Justice Rehaquist considered the doctrine to be applicable in the Indvsrial Union Dep't
case. See 448 U.S. at 671 (Rehaquist, J., concurring). Nevertheless, the delegation to the Board
under section 4(c)(8) appears to be safe from attack under the traditional delegation doctrine as
formulated by Justice Rehaquist.
Justice Rehaquist first attacked the statute before him in Industriral Union Dept. because it
gave the administrator no indication where to set standards for exposure to hazardous substances.
See id at 675. In addition, he found nothing in the statute's legislative history that limited the
administrator's discretion. See id at 676-82. He argued that the statute should be struck down
under the delegation doctrine because the administrator had no intelligible principle to guide the
exercise of his discretion, and courts had no standards against which to measure the administra-
tor's actions for lawfulness. See Id at 685-86.
In contrast, the Board is at least limited in its attempts to liberalize the exemption provision
by the Senators' requirement that a functional relationship exist between the proposed activity
and banking activities. See supra note 45. Thus the Board is not operating with a complete lack
of guidance in the exercise of its discretion. Courts have used this requirement to limit the Board's
power, as is demonstrated by the limitations on chaining together of close relationships imposed
by the Natonal CourAe court. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
Finally, Rehaquist noted that the Court looks to sources other than legislative history to
breathe life into otherwise vague delegations of legislative power. See Industrial Union Dep't, 448
U.S. at 682 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The court relied on the Board's expertise to support the
delegation to the Board of discretion under section 4(cX8). See supra notes 89-90 and accompany-
ing text. Expertise residing in the agency did not aid Justice Rehnquist because the policy question
Congress delegated was whether the statistical possibility of deaths should ever be disregarded in
light of the economic costs of preventing those deaths. See Indwstria Union Dep't, 448 U.S. 672
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power to intervene to achieve accountability, to legitimize the exercise
of administrative discretion, and erase clear uncertainty. 110 Under cur-
rent practices, accountability is maintained only if Congress undertakes
review on its own initiative.
V. CONCLUSION
With the adoption of a flexible and expansive interpretation of sec-
tion 4(c)(8), bank holding companies are able to expand their range of
nonbanking activities. The legislative history indicates that Congress
did not clearly intend that bank holding companies expand their activi-
ties, and analysis of the statute indicates that the public benefits test
does not adequately guard against potential dangers of liberalization.
Adverse competitive effects could be restricted by enforcing a strict
closely-related test or by altering the current statutory scheme to reflect
differences in holding company entry into regulated as opposed to com-
petitive industries. Perhaps the anticompetitive risks are sufficiently re-
mote that a flexible test is justified in all situations. In any case, these
options require serious study by Congress, the body responsible for
making important policy decisions. Congress should review the stan-
dards and policies evident in the Board's Citicorp Order and legitimize
or alter them on the basis of its findings.
Although the delegation doctrine as traditionally formulated does
not encourage Congress to undertake a review of standards established
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Because this was a question of social values, delegation could not be
justified on the basis of the agency's technical expertise. See id
Although section 4(c)(8) might survive Rehnquists test for permissible delegation of standard
setting in the first instance to an agency, the standards established by the Board have substantial
public policy overtones: they affect the viability of nonbank competitors' businesses and could
result in concentrations of power in the financial industry. If the delegation doctrine were recast
as suggested in this note, Congress could realize the benefit of agency expertise because delegation
of standard setting would be permissible. However, once the standards are set and the public
policy implications are known, courts would apply the doctrine to encourage congressional review
in order to establish Congress' accountability for the policy decisions made by the agency. See
supra text accompanying note 105.
110. Although nonbank competitors are threatened by the current Board policy, Citicorp and
other bank holding companies could be big losers should Congress decide to intervene in the
future for some reason. Citicorp noted in the hearings that development of expanded data serv-
ices capabilities by bank holding companies will entail great capital investments, and expressed
concern that decisions to make such investments can not be made prudently if the propriety of
bank holding company engagement in data services activities is subject to attack in the future.1981 House Hearings, supra note 57, at 319 (statement of Patrick Mulhem). Therefore, Citicorp
called for a clear statement of policy regarding bank holding company expansion of data services
activities. Id The Citicorp order grants clear approval of the proposed expansion of services, but
Congress concluded in 1956 and 1970 that nonbanking activities engaged in by holding companies
were excessive, and it could do so again. See supra note 6. By reviewing the Board's standards,
Congress could make clear its approval of the Board's policies.
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by agencies, the revisions in the doctrine proposed by Professor Davis
would achieve this result. Under the revised delegation doctrine, the
standard setting process delegated to the Board in the first instance is
permissible, but courts could subsequently refuse to uphold the statute
until Congress reviewed the Board's standards. Without such a revised
doctrine, accountability can be achieved only if Congress recognizes its
duty and reviews agency standards on its own initiative.
Christopher W. Loeb
